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tv   Soldier Civilian Experiences in the Korean War  CSPAN  May 11, 2024 4:26pm-5:41pm EDT

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it and and said, you know zedong in the ccp is going to be in charge so we just add a little bit more on that from the americans perspective if they want to go to war in korea to basically contain the soviet, but they don't want to escalate into a bigger war with the soviet union. they're trying to avoid world war three. so there's always that limit there. i think stalin also, he's prepared. give north korea the go ahead, but he doesn't want that war, an escalating into war between the united states and the soviet union. that's where i think mao comes in and plays a role. so if the war goes badly for north korea, it's going to be china, not the soviet union is directly in the firing line, which course is what happens in october-november. so china in that sense or deserves that function, helps to keep the war limited. we don't end up with a soviet us world war three, 1950 or 51. let's our panelists.
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we spent some time talking this morning about the war's causes and about sort of how the three years that most americans think of when they think of the korean war fit into a longer and a broader history. for our second part, we'll try to focus in a little bit on how the war played out in the lives of the individuals that were affected by it. as war in south and north korea, it ravaged the homes of millions, sometimes more than once. and we were talking about the yo yo effect of the war means war moves through your home once and then then again. it drew 6 million military personnel, not only from both north and south korea, but also from china, the united states, the soviet union and other united nations countries, including britain, canada,
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australia, france, the netherlands and many others. more than two and a half million people lost their lives, and millions more found their lives forever changed by the war. so i'm honored to introduce four historians whose work centers, individuals in their in the history of war and who will help us to see war through their perspective. to my immediate left is tarak barkawi, who is professor of political science at johns hopkins university, a historian of the relation between war armed forces and society in modern world politics. he is the author of soldiers of empire. and he is currently writing a book on the korean war and on the american experience of military defeat. david p klein is professor of history at san diego state university, where he is the founding director of the center for public and oral history. he's conducted interviews for the library of congress civil rights project and the national museum of african american history and culture, and his
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most recent book is twice forgotten. african americans and the korean war. suzy kim is professor of asian languages and cultures at rutgers university. his story of modern korea. the cold war and women. she is the author of life in the north korean revolution, as well as women across world's north korea and the global cold war. and last but not least, is dancing. mcmanus, who is the curators, distinguished professor at missouri university of science and technology. he's the author of 15 books on the u.s. military experience and the host of two podcast and his work on the korean war includes the seventh infantry. three combat in the age of terror. so one of the things that i think is really interesting about the korean war is that as a military conflict, we're thinking about it as a conflict, as a war. the korean war blended some seemingly contradictory ways of
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war. it occurred at the dawn of the nuclear age. and if some had had their way, might have been a war of nuclear and global catastrophic proportions. and yet much of the war occurred in. trenches reminiscent of world war one. and so i'm wondering if you could speak a little bit about how the wars participants experience this sort of dual ity, not just for military personnel from around the world who came to the war, but also for koreans whose homelands this war was raged. thank you, carol. so soldiers always compare their war to other wars, their battles to other battles in order to make sense of what's happening and this sort of process, what's going on. and the war on everybody's mind in the early stages of korea is, of course, world war two. and the u.s. had demobilized very sharply after world war two. so, you know, one thing that many of the returning veterans
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discover, first of all, they're angry that they're being called back up. having done their bit. but initially, you needed a lot of trained personnel. so people were called out to the reserves or just have after they'd started, families started careers and this kind of stuff. but, you know, when the veterans get there, they realize it's not the world war two army. all the training, all the careful tactics, the veteran formations who could carry this out were gone. and they had to relearn the stuff. they had to relearn things like aerial support of close air support. and this became a very, you know, serious issue early in the war where they work out, again, how it is that you're going to fight, provide close air support. airmen want to interdict for up the peninsula, but the marines and the soldiers want always the planes overhead getting the guys that they're immediately in contact with. things of this kind. another thing you're doing is using battles. so dunkirk figures back in the
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imagination of americans were in there in pusan and later in the chosen reservoir campaign and maybe all i'll stop this and turn this over to my friends with this quote from colonel paul freeman, who was in charge of the 23rd infantry division just as the chinese he you know, he's he he like the commander of the first marine division thinks they're in trouble when the u.n. forces are far in the north. and and macarthur's hoping to overall, the chinese, who he knows are present. and colonel paul freeman, he says, you know, he writes home to his wife, he says, we're in a combination of the second crusade, the march on moscow and bataan, you know, so but he gets his guys out, even if that got. musical chairs.
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thank you. i just wanted to start by thanking you and the history department for making this occasion possible and also those schmidt family for their generous donation. i guess i would i would take a little bit of issue with the question and the way that it was framed. i mean, rather than a comparison to world war one and trench warfare, i would say that the probably the apt comparison would be the vietnam war, which is very much a guerrilla war. i mean, given the terrain of the korean peninsula, where there are many hills and mountains, there's stories about the fact that when the war came to a stalemate starting in 1951, you were essentially, you know, trying to take over one hill and, you know, thousands of soldiers are being killed as a result of that one hill. so and what does it mean? talk about a guerrilla warfare. from a soldier's point of view,
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i think it means that it's very difficult. tell friend from foe, given that, you know, it was a war. it began as a civil war between the two koreas. and so, you know, from a soldier's point of view, who's coming in as a foreigner into korea, you can't really tell whether someone's from the north or the south and that made the fighting very difficult. and in fact, it led to many of the sort of, you know, the tragedy that we've heard about. there was one particular story that came out through the associated press in 1999 of civilian massacres in a town called kobani, where basically soldiers were given orders to shoot them all because they could not tell the difference between the refugees and who were enemy combatants. and from the civilians point of view, you can imagine just how terrified it would be to try to flee the war front. there was essentially difference between the war front and the home front. war zones were, you know, going up and down the peninsula and
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towns and cities were being taken by the occupation forces, multiple times. and basically, depending on what your behavior during that opposing occupation forces were, you would be held responsible essentially for having colluded with the previous regime. but of course, you know, as a civilian, you have essentially no choice. i mean, you have to do what you have to do to survive. and so i would just say that the korean war was a total war. and part of the tragedy for the civilian experience also was mentioned briefly. i think, in the first panel. but the the kind of carpet bombing that particularly the north was exposed to was very severe. so just to give you a little bit of statistic. i think rough estimates are something like 600,000 tons of bombs were dropped in north korea. and 32,000, 32,000 of those
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bombs were actually napalm. and as mary so eloquently explained in the first panel, i mean, napalm started to be used at the end of world were to and it demonstrated its explosiveness, particularly with the bombing of tokyo and some of the japanese cities which were you know, because of the fact that so many of the homes were made of wood. i mean, it completely decimated it from the fires that went through these towns. but by and large and i think most of the public were not quite familiar or aware of the devastating impact of napalm and it was really with the korean war that that the full strength of that weapon was shown. and even though in the american memory today, it's much more often associated with the vietnam war, it's actually during the korean war that napalm was really used and not only did it impact the soldiers that were fighting, but you can imagine the impact on the
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civilians. so the comparison is that in all of the pacific theater during world war two, the there were 500,000 tons of bombs dropped. so during the short period of the korean war, there were more bombs, at least by 100,000 tons more bombs dropped in north korea than all of the pacific theater during world war two. yeah. in terms of the the comparisons with with vietnam, from the communist point of view, it's really similar in the sense of attempting guerilla war first because north korea attempts to basically destroy south korea via guerilla war in the late 1940s and then leads to the course conventional invasion, which is, you know, over a much more protracted period of time in in vietnam. but the takeaway from a military historian's point of view is that the korean war, like the vietnam war, is both a convention deal and a guerilla war at the soldier level with well, with a mix of ingredients
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coming from world war one in terms of fixed trench type positions that going to have in the stalemate period. you know, but if we're thinking about the sort of impact of nuclear weapons in this whole kind of soldier. i think for the average american soldier, at least, there's really much more concern about what's actually tactically in front of you on any given day. and it's it's the nuclear side of it is much more for the senior leadership to kind of wonder and sort of nightmare game. for instance, when general ridgway takes over as commander of eighth army and then later succeeds, macarthur is the theater commander. he's constantly having to worry and wargame about the possibility of this thing going nuclear, mainly through soviet intervention. he has to figure out exactly how are we going to be tenable on korea, especially, you know, if if the soviets get in and and, you know, the nuclear side
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probably be the u.n. side having the initiative in that regard of going nuclear first because they had greater capability at that stage. but it's really quite interesting because ridgway is having to kind of sort of work through these nightmare scenarios. the average soldier on the ground, though, is is mainly worried about he'll x, y or z and where they're going to go. what you're going to eat the next day is always and the conditions do we haven't even touched on that. that's such a huge part of the experience. yeah, i'll just take as my cue so the, the work that i've done is sort of a deep dive into the soldier experience itself, right? by focusing mostly on the african american soldier experience and so when the war broke out, you know, so this is picking up on a couple of points. when the war broke out, you know, most of the at least the segregated black units, they you know, they were on occupation duty in japan.
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they were on maneuvers in hawaii, and they got sent in, you know, immediately as part of task force. smith some of the units anyway, you know, in summer uniforms with rifles that didn't work and know this was part of the downsizing of the military. but of course, you know, the african-american units got the worst of that. and so in terms of the conditions right in a summary uniform and then heading straight, you know, and the beginning of the war was relatively warm when the hit started. but it certainly got cold quicker as soon as they went north. and the p.o.w. experience is yet another one to look out at the conditions. i talked to a number of of guys who, you know, were captured in the first few days of the war in, their summer uniforms and then marched north and that anyone survived of those marches. it's kind of incredible. and then, you know, on their own
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and then got to the camps and, you know, the chinese entering the war from the soldier's perspective is fascinating, right? because you hear all those about what it sounded like and the bugles and and all of that from the p.o.w. perspective of the chinese entering the war was a little bit of a godsend because they brought quilted uniforms. so for the first time, those who had survived that long finally had some warmth. so that's the only thing i'll add on that. yeah. come on. yeah, just a couple of points. it's always important to make a distinction between the first year of the war when it is a war of movement and the rest of the war. when that settles into when we talk about massacres, we often think about things like no country, where there's a straight up massacre or the way that my lai dominates imagination in vietnam. but much of the war was fought around peasant populations, and
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the peasants would often come out at night thinking that would be safer. but of course, that's not safer. and there is not the same media attention in korea. so you'll get some american, you know, officers talking about how positions are littered with dead peasants who've come out at night and gotten shot by who are watching their positions. so there's sometimes that kind of quotidian in way in which there are casualties. like that's kind of one point i'd make on the napalm stuff is, is, is very interesting because from the point of view of ground troops, it looks for american ground troops, it looks very effective. it's both horrifying, fascinating and effective. they love it. they want more of it. there's something about wanting to see asian opponents burned that really appeals to american soldiers. but, you know, also just as tactically effective.
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but for the pilots, people who had been involved in close air support in the pacific, in world war two, had dropped it on on a toles with small civilian or no civilian population and the japanese anime they hated early in the war. they're asked to drop it on refugee columns. they're told there may be kpa troops in and you get some pushback by the pilots. they're not happy about that. i'm not actually going to do that. but by the time you get the war goes north, every single built structure is seen as a target because in the cold that is protection for chinese and north korean troops. so they start literally trying to take out every city and village that you can imagine. so by then, the kind of fears of bombing people have dropped away as as the war really gets more vicious. just say one last tiny thing, which is that the americans don't have a tactical evac switch in equipment early in the
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war. they're bazookas. world war two, they have m-1 rifles. they're finding the first ak 47 on on the battlefield, a weapon. they wouldn't get an equivalent until 15 years later. it's sherman tanks first t-34 85. and then when the chinese come in, a lot of them are armed with american infantry weapons because the chinese are taking stocks that we sent to support the nationalist chinese. so they're being fired at by browning's bars, you know, m-1 and so on. you can imagine what that felt like. if i would just follow very quickly to a text point about kind of the racialization, i think, involved in order to actually take pleasure or to turn a blind eye towards suffering of the civilians. and as you put it, it's to see them burn and somehow take some kind of satisfaction out of that. and david, you could also speak to this, but you know, there was a way in which i think the
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thinking about the and the asian enemy as a kind of a yellow -- that that you dehumanize them, that come so that was carried over from the fact that, you know, world war two had just ended, you know, five years earlier and japan was an enemy that, you know, that we had fought, as in the united states. and so that, i think, was very much in evidence during the korean war. and you you hear about these anecdotes of soldiers essentially, you know, thinking about koreans, not quite you know, there would be basically racial slurs that are to refer to the population in such a way that would kind of immunize them or, you know, kind of be able to not feel the emotions that you would as a as a regular human being. that in some ways is it is basically another way to not just dehumanize the enemy, but really dehumanizes the soldiers
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themselves. well, and the other thing to to circle back to to other points earlier about people getting killed at night when they when they're out there wandering around, when you've got h.a., you know, artillery fire out there, which is what you're going to do on a on a kinetic battlefield, the enemy could be moving out there at night. we are going to we're going to light our fires wherever we think those rights of movement are. the other sort of tradition that been firmly established in the way the americans have made war since world war two, certainly is hunker down in perimeters at night and shoot at anything that moves outside that perimeter. and i have argued many times that we basically see the movement of the night to our until the night vision era to great extent, because we fight the pacific war this way. we fight the european war this way. and i'm generalizing. there are exceptions. we fight the korean war, we fight the vietnam. this war, you know this way too. and so it i think it brings to mind from the start of the korean civilian point of view, i mean, the main way to get killed is by america and firepower
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where somebody's firepower or sort of in the mix somehow than certainly there aren't that many deliberate killings or the tragic situation early in the war, like you said, with no gun ri where we're worried that you've got north korean infiltrators coming through in the refugee columns. we don't know who's who. and you have these orders to open fire. if people don't stop you, it's just koreans who are killing civilians. you know, the anyone suspected to be communist in the war, not necessarily the american sort doing the massacring, but they're aware of it. they're aware of it, exactly. yeah. yeah. i mean, one of the things that we're sort of shifting to naturally in the conversation is the role of civilians and the impact of the war on civilians. and korea certainly is a marker of that. and i think it's emblematic of the cold war at large. is that the vast majority casualties are civilian. by the end of the korean war, in particular, half the population are refugees. and so is there something maybe
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particular about the korean war that makes that happen? is it guerrilla warfare? is it is there something on the racialization that makes the civilian experience something that historians should pay attention to in increased ways? i mean, i think it's the potency of both sides. i mean, these are are two very formidable adversaries that are bringing a lot of firepower to bear and are fighting weirdly, are kind of total. and yet limited war in a way. in other words, there's very little quarter after given in the sort of combat environment. and both sides are using all the firepower they can certainly bring to bear, especially the americans with airpower, too, that they really have an advantage over the communist side. both sides see this to a great extent as a war for keeps. both sides are thinking maybe this is the place to come to account with the other, at least for the first year or so before you settle the negotiations and whatnot. and the koreans are so intimately involved in it as combatants and it's right there on their soil, too.
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so it's it's really i think it has many different layers to it of why ends up being so bloody for the for the koreans. yeah. i mean i would say, i mean in answering this question, i think it might be worth thinking about like what were what was the korean war really about and what was the cold war about? and as the first panel kind of went into, i think the reason why there's so much debate about when does the korean war start is is essentially because there was this conditions of civil war that were already very much there well before 1950. and in some ways, it was a failure of the political project backed by the allied powers to set up a unified korean government on the korean peninsula. that essentially led to these two separate states. and if you think about the fact that, you know, just to reiterate the point that was made in the first panel that korea was divided at the 38th
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parallel without any korean input at all, just by, you know, a random couple of american officials, a proposal that was made to the soviet union. you know, and i think there was actually, you know, some discussions that, oh, you know, maybe this proposal would not be accepted by the soviet union, given that japan was clearly occupied by the u.s., which meant that, you know, as the soviet forces were already fighting the japanese in the northern tip of the korean peninsula towards the end of world war two, that it would be sort of the natural outcome for the division of the occupation to basically be that the soviets would take over korea and then, you know, japan would be held by the united states. but of lo and behold, the proposal was accepted by the soviet union. so, i mean, both parties are responsible in that sense, i think. but the fact that no koreans were consulted at all and you know what i impress upon my students, because i think
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oftentimes there's a tendency to believe that the korean war is what led to the division of korea, but the division actually predates the korean war. and, in fact you know, even before talking about, you know, what i mean, it's true that you know, the beginning of the korean war, depending on one's perspective, can vary. and i think it was a really important point made in the first panel, but if you think about kind of thinking, you know, would the korean war have even started if there had not been the division of korea, if somehow the occupation was a collaborative effort between the allied powers? you know, i think about that all the time, just because of the fact that the war solved nothing. you know, the 30th parallel is no longer the division b to the north and south, but essentially the dmz, the demilitarized zone that separates the two koreas, are moral. along the 38th parallel. so, you know, after millions of people having been killed on many side, the war is not
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resolved. and even to this day, you know, the two koreas remain divided and the issue of separated families, i mean, there are i don't i mean, i don't know the exact number, but i believe that there are hundreds, if not thousands of korean americans with separated family members in the north who were not able to visit because some of them were actually able to visit. but the the former president had put in a travel ban. i mean, it was oftentimes referred to as the muslim ban, but it actually included north korea as one of the countries to which travel is no longer allowed. and you need a special permission by the state department to be able to visit. oh, right. so the political objective that failed basically at the end of world war two for the allied powers to come together to set up a unified government. that essentially led to the civil war. and then i would also say, you know, the cold war context in which the korean war is being
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fought, i mean, what is the cold war really about. i mean, it's a it's a it's a war of ideology. and i think it's a war of ideologies in which both sides are basically looking upon the other as an iraq force in other words, you know, it's a it's a good and it's a fight of good and evil. good versus evil, in which the other side must perish. and that that view, i think, is mirrored equally, whether you're looking at the soviet union or the united states. and if that is the view of the cold war, then there's no there's no living together. there's no compromise. there's no negotiation. and i sometimes think about what extent has that kind of mood and that kind of worldview. it's a manichean worldview that essentially lee, i think, has come down to this day, to our very present with many of the conflicts that we are currently surrounded by. and, you know, i try to impress upon what i'm teaching, try to impress upon my students.
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how do we get out from that view? we're basically the only option is to kill your enemy. i just had that. to me, it's so much about perspective. obviously, we've talked about that a bit, but you know, from the grunt side view was the cold war, right? i mean that especially, you know, especially the the folks that i look at, you know, they had no idea where korea was. they had no idea who koreans were. and all they knew is that they were, you know, trying to survive. right. and in terms of so it's a very different way of looking at it. and then in terms of, well, i got to go fight these other people. and so who is the enemy in terms of the racialization? question that too, we think of this more in vietnam, i think. but it was very much going on in korea as well in that the north koreans and especially the chinese did appeal on racial
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grounds to african-american soldiers and there were leaflet drops, etc. saying, what are you doing here? why are you me? right. so this is something that we think of later with muhammad ali. but the the chinese especially were and in the camps that they ran where various do about this were paul robeson recordings in the exercise yard you know and a number of the african-american p.o.w.s you know talked about i didn't learn african-american history in the us, but i learned it a p.o.w. because the chinese were were really appealing on and on those grounds and many of the chinese officers were educated in places like texas, and they knew their american history. so yeah. so the the term severely is extremely important and what i'm about to say, i don't want to be
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hurt to be diminishing the legal, the political or the ethical importance of the distinction between civilians and combatants. but civilian is not a kind of sociological or historic goal term. it doesn't really capture the involved of populations in wars that are popular right. so one of the things that i think has been underplayed in the two panels so far is the significance of japanese imperialism in korea and in china for the korean war. so the korean left is allied with the chinese communists and there are many koreans fighting in the chinese civil war with mao in the later stages of the chinese. so when the chinese volunteer come to north korea, there is a fraternal relationship between those two, two populations and then an anti-coal animal struggle. right? that's a popular struggle, right. so, you know the people involved
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in the chinese civil war, not just the combatants. similarly, koreans are in the imperial japanese army and then the imperial japanese army in manchuria and china and and are in the what become the south korean police later is largely manned by people who were in the japanese security koreans. right. so like if the cop was serving the japanese and now he's serving in the anti anti-communist south korean regime, and then he comes to the village and, wants to call out all the peasants who are associated or can be seen as leftists and arrest them. that distinction, civilian combatant doesn't really capture what's going on. the of sociology and politics of anti-colonial struggles, of peasants struggles against, land regimes that support landlords and so on. so i think we we need to think
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of this dimension when we use that term civilian as well. well and that's the ultimate center of gravity is the civilian population, whatever term we use or whatever koreans actually want in the end for their country. yes, we've got the kinetic battles and all that kind of stuff. but do you want there to be a south korea? is that something you are willing to fight for and sacrifice and lose so many people? do you want a north korea? you know, and i think the answer in both cases is yes. and so that's why you end up with some level of this equilibrium. and that's what's a little bit different from vietnam. not that there aren't many, many anti-communist vietnamese, but in the end, this becomes not, you know, that kind of center of gravity really, really goes in favor of the communists because the noncommunist side needs a little too american help. from an american point of view to make that happen. whereas in korea, dynamic is certainly very different, especially about the end of the war when south korea has really
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strengthened quite a bit. it's a feature of the korean peninsula when what suzy is talking about when they divide the peninsula, you regroup. the korean left north and the korean and japanese collaborators go south. that's who we were working with, which was always a problem. and the americans are aware of that. so what is a civil conflict or a political conflict between koreans becomes an interstate conflict? i actually wanted to kind of bridge some of these comments, say that i mean, to look at i guess the i mean, as kind of ambiguous is the term civilian can be the civilian population in the united states actually during the war going back to something that david mentioned that you i think there's a tent. i mean, i really don't like the term the forgotten war because in order to forget you needed to have known something but it's not clear to me that there was actually much known so in fact you know, it's too bad that
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bruce cummings couldn't be here. he's he's actually my teacher. and i was really looking forward to seeing him in the first round. no, but you know, he he prefers the term, the unknown, because it's actually about a deliberate kind of a knowing. and one of the t we don't know much about is actually the extent to which was major anti-war activism in this country during the korean war in ways that could parallel vietnam war, but not obviously well known. and in fact, you know, one of the people that were very vocally against the korean war was paul robeson and. i was so glad that you mentioned that, because he's actually an alum of rutgers and he's, you know, he has he had such a major career. i mean, as an athlete, as a as singer, as an activist. but, you know, i have to say a few i think he's an alumni of maybe the class 1912 or something like that. and a few years ago, we basically had a centennial of of a paul robeson.
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and, you know, they were basically telling stories, his career at rutgers and then onto his other things. and i was struck by the extent to which they didn't mention at all his anti-war activism during the korean war. no, i know. well, because that takes us to some very uncomfortable areas. that's how cozy he was with communists in communism and how he was really used. communist propaganda on many levels. and so i'm not surprised to hear that, because i don't know that any administrator would want that. you know, front and center in terms of a centennial celebration. it's really interesting to me the way this is how you the what you're saying points to the fact that military service and wars mean different things to different people and and change over time as well. and so one of the interesting things, i mean, sort of going over what david mentioned earlier about the racial integration of the american military, is that military service is obviously burden and a profound risk. but it has also been used over time by many individuals and
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groups of people to access certain benefits or claims of full citizenship. and so i'm wondering if we could talk just for a second about how americans and koreans of both the north and the south, chinese, soviets, the participants in this sort of how they thought of the war and what it meant in that sense. i'll take this one. okay. he's ready now? no, we'll have. so so yeah. you know, this is one of the big questions, right? i focus on the african-american experience in the war is, you know, why serve right. and and there are a lot of different motivations and because i focus so much on individual stories. you know, some folks didn't have a choice. for some, it was economic. but what you really get the combination, i would say, of the individual voices and the really close read of the black press.
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and you really to pay attention to the black press during and before and during the war is a very real understand adding that this was going to be a lever. right. that this was and it had been in the past. but at this point. and in our history and you know, so truman calls for the desegregation, the military in 1948 and the war breaks out in 1950 and is the civil rights movement right. is is is as we know it is is beginning and is a sort of an infancy is absolutely wrong. but is is beginning to grow right and if you see the black press is really saying we've to serve right robeson is interesting. robeson is one of the few black voices he's saying don't serve use that as a lever, you know, refuse to serve. and that's a lever to to get
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what we want. but the majority of saying we're going to we're going to go and serve and we're going to demand our rights through this, through the service. so that's the main thing that comes across there. yeah. which is, of course, not new for african-american. no. i mean, it's it's it's a world war two is a huge part of this. do double double v campaign. and the world war one. i mean, even, you know, going back to the civil war and whatever always been this kind of dilemma for african americans. do we fight for a country will not treat us as equals. what comes out of that? do we dissent? what are what kind of citizenship are we going to have? you know, what will military service lead to? i think i think that's partially what's so interesting about the korean war, is that you finally see the united states begin to to at least start, for lack of a better word, rewarding african-americans by actually treating them as somewhat equals, once we have the post
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executive order 9981, an actual real integration and in because of the war in is what really gives wings to the integration that had been kind of conceptual before and equality and and all these kinds of things that will somewhat follow in and you know after the war from from a white soldier's perspective it is i think, you know, if i'm generalizing more of the kind of patriotic. well, it's your time now and communism's a threat and we don't want them taking over japan or, you know, this is another threat of dictatorship, just like hitler and lee. and so your older brother fought in in world war two. and so now it's it's your and and go and do your because we re-implement the draft of course. and you know, i don't think that there's, you know, massive draft dissent. certainly there's some. but you at least are able to raise some level of the manpower we need to fight the war. and i think that's kind of the mainstream soldier's point of
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view from my perception, at least. i share an anecdote. so for my my first book came out in 2013 and it was about the history of north korea from 1945 to 1950, leading up to the war and it the copy editor, i mean, usually, i don't know if you know, this is going to be a little tedious about kind of the process of publishing, but the copy editor essentially is someone that makes sure that your grammar and your spelling and all these things are accurate and is not necessarily the one that's doing a close kind of fact check of the contents. the arguments that you're making. but the copy editor that i and usually the press assigns a copy editor based on their roster and so it's kind of, you know, it's out of my hands but the copy editor was so detailed you know they were like he would be including like can you maybe explain a little bit more here and just went out of his way,
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you know, above and beyond his call of duty really to make to really help me improve the book and i was so grateful and then i was, you know, the whole time, i'm wondering why, why? and then he shared this. thanks. he sent me an email and copy. editors usually don't connect directly with the authors. they just work with the publishers. but he got in touch with me and shared anecdote that pretty much kind of stopped me in my tracks because he said his dad served in the korean war and he he had passed on, but he so wished that his dad had had a chance to read my book because he thought that he would really appreciate it. and you know i was taken aback by that comment already because i thought, you know, i'm looking at north korean history using north korean documents that were actually during the korean war. so these are primary sources that you can't actually even find in north korea itself today. but it's in washington, d.c. at the national archives. so that's the bulk of the
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archives that i used. and into it it approaches the history from a very much north korean perspective. and, you know, most of the time when i try to talk about this work, i mean, some people appreciate, but i've also gotten a lot of pushback, as you can imagine. so then i was like, you know, why would his dad appreciate this? so he goes on to tell the story about fact that given that the korean war was the first time there was an integrated armed forces, it was the first time for him as a white american to actually be serving next to an african-american. and he was able to hear stories, his experience in the united states, which really woke him up to all the, you know, the jim crow and the, you know, the the segregation, the discrimination and the racism that, you know, african-americans in country have to face. and so he after he served and he went back came back home, he ended up later on, becoming a really active participant of the
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civil rights as a result of his time serving during the korean war. and when read that story, you can imagine just as a korean american, the way that somehow the serendipity and the luck that i had to get this copy. ed totally by chance, and the care with which he put his efforts and to making the book a better book. i just i'm so eternally grateful, not just him, but, you know, his dad story also. so that's you know, that's just an anecdote to share. but that's something now wearing my more scholarly hat. i would say the there's a lot to be said about what the korean means looking at the way that it's referred to so for us, using english, the korean war is pretty simple. but actually the way that in korean language, the way that koreas are referred to in the north and south are completely
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different. they use totally different words to refer to the koreas so that book that i just told you about, the translation finally came out this summer. so all summer was basically in korea, making sure that the translation was accurate. and this was really important to because it was essentially treating north korean history, but being published in the south. and i wanted to sure that it was not using the terminologies that are commonly used in the south, that it would be faithful to the terminologies used during the time that i'm speaking about historic. lee and so i was actually at the trip, thank goodness i'm bilingual. so i was looking at the translation and with a fine tooth comb. in any case, one of the major sticking points between editor and myself was how to refer to the korean war. someone like my mom's generation. for them, it's 6 to 5. it's the way that we refer to, for example, nine, 11.
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it's the date when these smaller attacks across the border, this brewing civil war, basically escalates into a full blown war. june 25th. but you the edit the reason and so i wanted to say let's just refer to it as 6 to 5 that's you know that was most familiar to that generation that having to refer to either korea in either fashion. but then the can you imagine why the editor in korea had issues with that basically and it's largely thanks to bruce cummings who isn't here, but his origins of the korean war. the full translation actually out for the first time this past summer, just completely coincidentally with the translation of my book and even with previous translations that in the 1980s it was actually a banned book in south korea at one point because was considered so controversial from the south korean point of view.
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but his his reference to the korean war was, according to south korean terminology, as how tan jane. and so he was basically saying, you know, the 6 to 5 reference is often times used by those who really want to delimit and simplify the origins of the war to that particular date. and you've already learned ton from the first panel we why there are sort of issues with that and why we might want to have a more complicated and nuanced understanding. so he said you're basically playing right back into the hands of kind of the cold war logic of dating the korean war to june 25th. he had a fair argument, but i also thought, you know, i mean, as much as i love my teacher and he's so dear to me and i so much from him, i said, you know, there is a difference between his scholarship as a white american and my scholarship as a korean american and who is fully bilingual, grew up bilingually. you know i don't think bruce would mind me saying that he
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probably did not, you know, review his translation to the extent that i did mine and to me, these terminologies are super important because it actually is a step towards how do we how do we come to some kind of a reconciliation and how do we come to a compromise that despite these very different views about the korean war, that we can somehow show share common ground. and i just i have to thank dr. barry's keynote yesterday, because i feel like that emphasis how to recover the dead, how to honor the dead really gives a kind of a stepping stone for how we might, because i think everyone can agree that we should honor the dead. well, that might come in here. take us a little bit back to the african-american story. the units deployed in korea were segregated in the beginning of the war, and one of them was the 24th infantry regiment.
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and it partici painted in what was reported as the first american victory. yet china in the summer of 1950 and this was picked up by the black press and reported as an african-american victory. but when the history books came out, when the official came out and some of the other popular histories came out, the 24th infantry regiment was portrayed as having run away, as having fled combat, as having an in this regiment. there's a group of, you know, the it's a jim crow regiment, right so it's the army dumps its worst officers in it, and it has a lot of southern officers who are white officers, white officers or white officer. i'm about worst white officers. and there's some funny stuff about how the yankee officers would come in and in order get accepted by the southern
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officers, they would act as racist as the southerners towards towards their own troops. but in this unit, they're also a group of black professional officers, many of whom are world two veterans who are serious soldiers. some of them had been cultivated by james and were in paratroop units in world war two, and they knew both that the you know, the 24th infantry regiment wasn't, some crack, you know, elite unit that made the north koreans run away. but nor was it someone just, you know, ran away. and to the extent did run away. all of the units were running away. and what they were concerned about is something i many soldiers are concerned about that a correct history is told of what happened with with now also want all the warts in there as well but these professional officers they wanted the jim crow side of the story but they also wanted the story of what they did well of their victories and of the things that they and
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they to fight a battle all the way into the 1980s to convince the army to review the official history that world. appleman had originally written about first year of the war. i there are court cases about this, but i'm still sort of hunting this down and they get ronald secretary of the army to commission a book that was called a black soldier a white and they went back over this history and did a proper job of this in order to make those african-american and veterans feel that their story had finally been recognized and told properly. and that's the add one very short comment to that. to me, all of that is part of the wages of racism in the sense of the existence of segregation, existence of jim crow, all of this idea of black soldiers don't fight then creates an environment where this unit an infantry regiment can't be like
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any other unit that has its kind of ups and downs now all of a sudden, everything is political, oh, they won't fight. so that justifies those continuing hardcore jim crow oh, they're the ultimate supermen. let's have civil rights, you know. so that you have this advocacy, then when all the soldiers want to do is is their job and fight and survive, you know, but really how fortunately has to be more than that and then it plays out in the official history side do i think one thing that has that we haven't said explicitly that needs to be said explicitly is that one of the important things about the korean war is that it does lead to the desegregation of the u.s. military. right. and one of the things that i think a lot of people sort of get wrong is truman know truman integrated the armed forces. not not so. right. but what you know truman calls for that, he said and there's also a big difference between desegregation and integration and if we want to get into those weeds, i'll take you there. but i'm not going to do that right now. but but truman calls for the
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desegregation. in 48, you know, and the the air force says, okay. and the navy says, yeah, okay, we'll start this tomorrow. and the army says, not in the marines don't even respond. so, you know, but it's not. but the war when you need a replacement body, you take whatever body comes to you. and it's the war that desegregated the the us military and. in point of fact, you know, the us military wasn't fully desegregated even by the end of the war. and we were talking about earlier, if you look a little bit broader into the national guard units, it around for a really long time. but coming back to sort of perspective, what are the the the fun things that i found in doing this work comparing the news coverage of truman's executive order between, say, the new york times and the
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chicago defender. right. so the new york times on this in very small font, normal font. what happened on the yesterday? it's in a list of that happened on the hill that day. the chicago defender goes full titanic with the the headline know it's the 172.5 truman wipes out segregation in the u.s. military. again, that's hopeful, right? is not that's not it. but it tells you what is at stake, right. and so i think that's something that that i that i found a really interesting little nugget. i might those two had put those two front pages up on my desk side by side. i feel like i left you hanging a little bit because i mentioned that the wars to by different names and different parts and i just wanted to finish that thought of. so in south korea, it's referred to as the korean war using the
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reference to korea in the in the korean convention as he tending in the north. it's referred to as the fatherland liberation war. it's not an entirely accurate translation insofar as the reference to fatherland is actually not gendered and the original korean so so my my preference for the translation is actually the homeland liberation war and you can imagine why they refer to it that way because they see it as a war to liberate the south from us occupation, something to know that north korea lost about upwards of 20%. estimates it's the korean war. the number of deaths in the korean war is, you know, like any war, i think very difficult to estimate but something to you know, i always like to mention this because i think for lots of folks, even though there a sense that the korean war was very deadly, it's not quite put it into put into context.
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so after the two world wars, the two other deadliest wars, international wars are the korean war and the vietnam war. and the casualty rates are roughly similar. the total casualty rate are roughly similar between, vietnam and korea, despite the fact that the vietnam war is conventionally dated to about, you know, almost 20 years, whereas the korean war is only three. so much, much deadlier and the north, as i think others, have mentioned already, because of this kind of bombing, i mean, after the military targets were more or less gone in the first few months of the war the bombing continued. and so i think some estimates put that about 20%, upwards of 20% of the north korean population were basically killed by the war. i mean, that's that's equivalent to the kind of casualty rates that i think the soviet union is known to have suffered by the end of world war two.
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so, you know, almost every single family was impacted by the war in the north and to this day, the does anyone know what the conscription years, the mandatory conscription for all bodied males in north korea today are it's 8 to 10 years. so basically your entire youth, more or less, is spent in the military and even for women who are not necessarily require to serve, many women actually do join the military because it's considered a career boost, because it's you know, it looks good on your resume, but but, you know, so when when hear statistics like the north military forces like the fourth largest in the world, at 1.2 million men, all of that needs to be put into perspective as essentially another sort of impact of the korean war that north korea very much considers itself as still being engaged in
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a state of war. that's not ended. so i want to leave it a few minutes at the end for questions, but i also want to ask for the the same question i asked of the first panel in that from your perspective, as someone who writes about the perspective soldier perspective, the perspective from the ground up, why should americans care about the korean war or what should we put in our pocket and take home? you changed up on the. oh, well, i'll say if you care at all about knowing anything about the cold war, you've got to understand something about the korean war, because korean war really is arguably the most important event of the cold war. it sets the tone, the cold war. it sets the tone for, the cold war in the sense of becoming a kind of steam valve for the superpowers or fighting in so-called peripheral areas, which are then going to see vietnam, angola, name of the country. i mean, this the sort of pattern that's that it the pattern that
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you are not going to have a nuclear exchange. we know that in retrospect, but there are, of course, plenty of points of tension along those lines, but that both sides are willing to pull back and accept a limited war. i think sometimes that's what we look past in the us, the political right in the 1950s, the mccarthyite right saying we sold out in korea, we didn't get our victory. you know, the macarthur of viewpoint, the other side chose to fight a limited war to the soviets could have sent their navy to interdict the between japan and korea. the soviets could have sent air assets. they could have sent ground troops. the chinese could have stepped up, sent more and done more. so both sides are willing to accept some level of rationality in the cold, which is a major reason why we're all alive and here today. so i think it's a matter of some importance from a soldier's perspective. it shows you just what can happen when not prepared adequately by your policymakers. perhaps by your commanding
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officers, when you're not equipped with the proper weapons. when you are, you have fallen behind the curve of your enemies. when you have basically overinvested. and again, this is my point of view is on historian of ground combat soldiers primarily. but when you have overinvested in the excellent assets of airpower, airpower, nuclear power and all that at the expense of ground power and, we make this mistake and have for generations now, and that has never yet abated, unfortunately. and i think that the korean war can teach us a heck of a lot of lessons in that regard, in my opinion. i'll just follow up on that so my second book came out last year and. it was largely it'd be there's a of elements to but basically it starts with the korean war and another little known fact about one aspect of that war was that there was a group of delegates of international women that actually visited northern korea in 1951. they were recruited by a left
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wing pro-communist women's organization, an international women's organization at the invitation of the north korean women to come basically see what was happening, to tell the world about it, because there was there was heavy censorship, essentially, that blocked any of overt photos or references to kinds of tragedies that were happening, the ground. so 21 women from 17 countries went to north korea. there's memoirs that had written about it that are out of print now because it was printed in the 1950s. but i begin with that because. it's a it's a book about north korean women and their engagement with some of the international women's movements and it was striking to read these women's testimonies about what they saw and the way that they tried to actually connect, because i think they really unprepared and in witnessing what they ended up seeing and many of them having just
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survived world war two, where actually saying they could not possibly have imagined that the level of destruction would be worse than, for example, dresden or some other parts. but they said this is this is worse than anything we had imagined. and many of them actually drew connections to the fact that if we do not stop this war, it would become world war. and what is to say that what is happening here isn't going to happen in our own cities? and they reference each of the cities they held from. and you know the the group was sponsored by a pro-communist women's group. you know, it was really important for them to demonstrate that the the delegation would be, you know, have credibility because essentially they were going to write up a report and send it on to the united nations. and so there was actually a really concerted attempt to include women from a broad of both countries and regions and political and some of the
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memoirs go into actual detail about the clashes that they, you know, like they were basically having to debate and fight, you know, duke it out about like what they would do or not do. and yet they were, i think, uniformly in agreement came up with the consensus report about the fact that, you know, the war is not just happening over there and think this is this is what you know, this is the takeaway then. and i think this is the takeaway here now. you know, we have a tendency to think and, you know, mary dudziak did such a great job of reminding us of this in your comments also in the first panel. but there's a tendency which you know, our wars now because it does require congressional approval, because it's happening overseas, that unless we really make an attempt to pay attention, we can kind of ignore it you know, we go about our daily lives and the nice weather and the good food, but we forget that the war is fought with our tax dollars. and so, you know, to not consider the wars as just
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happening over there, that they're right, i think is an important takeaway for us. i'll just have this quickly and a number of people have said that they don't like the title their forgotten war. i'm going to i'm going to speak for it. i think it's great it's good it for a book title would say in fact maybe double twice or twice forgotten but so but it's funny because you know, i, i came to this work, you know, not as a military historian. i came from outside and specific, only started working at the black experience, the war pretty much right at the beginning along with the p.o.w. experience. and i never even question forgotten war because if you're looking at it from their perspective of it, is that they were forgotten, right? they were between world war two and vietnam. they they had no you know, they had no parades when they came back. and, you know, as someone who's
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an oral historian, spent 20 years talking to these folks, it's both forgotten and untold. right they never told their families the stories. many of the people that i interviewed, it was the first time that they had told these stories. i had some interviews where i got an hour and half into the interview and i turned around, realized that there were 20 people in the living when there had just been two of us because, hey, dad's telling the story that he had never told before and in terms of take i'd say, you know, so that's one part of it is recognizing the war itself that that really not looked at in the same way but also recognizing the veterans right. and recognizing those served. and i think that that's a takeaway to no matter the conflict. okay so here's how i would answer this question. i grew up often very critical of
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u.s. military and other intervention abroad in, the cold war. and as i got older, how many people do you go a little bit more to the center, even to the right. but i'm on a university campus where students are extremely critical of, you know, u.s. militarism they don't want u.s. militarism in gaza and palestine. israel. and, you know, it's nato's that there's a war in ukraine and, you know, the u.s. dictatorships and repressive regimes around world. well, one of the things one of my kind of stock answers to this is, south korea, which surely was a repressive military regime for much of its history in the cold war. but this generated an indigenous south korean democratic movement that democratized the country and without in any way covering
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up some of the class divisions and in south korea, that is a very vibrant democracy that recalls locks up its ex-presidents. i'll just leave that handed and produces things like k-pop fashion and cars. you can see, you know, in parking lots and so on and so forth. had we not fought the korean war, that would not be there now. i thought we were going to end. it's complicated. and now our k-pop. so we'll take a couple quick questions from the audience. david schmitt not really a question. more of a comment and no thoughts that the my father was a 20 year old fighter pilot. korea flew about 100 missions and he just told me one time he goes, yeah, anytime. we went on a mission that was long, we would just drop our tip
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tanks on a village before because we couldn't land with. so we would drop them on a village no, i never thought about it much until recently and i thought was he ordered to do that or your thought. all right, i'll take it on. i'm just speculating here. that that i mean, it's just simply considered to be too unsafe to land with with that, you know, weighing and that it's very he would definitely told to drop yeah and let them land with exactly so he's not going to leave they're not going to let you land with them because of the pride. the safety problem would be my guess. but why out a village? because it's very possible. communist forces are clustering in the villages. according to at the time. now that just is not the whole picture. sure. but i and i'm just speculating
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the answer. but that is the only thing that seems to make any i don't think it's because there's a deliberate attempt to try and kill as many innocent people as possible or something along those lines. but it is certainly a moral dilemma. i think. hard to say. i mean, like i would imagine they would drop them over the ocean, over, you know, and not think which did happen to underneath them. that sounds like maybe a very aggressive squadron commander. that was his signature that we're going to drop him on on a village. and it may have been the part of war that i was discussing earlier where built environment was seen as a potential place where chinese or north korean could warm up and hide it at night, which indeed many they did. so i suspect that sounds like a unit level thing rather than that general order to always look for a village to drop your drop tanks on. ron mail and texas tech
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university with the creation of the air force in 1947 and the strategic thought process that goes into what were created for what was extent to which that affected close air support, tactical bombing on the ground, grunts on the ground. yeah. so i mean, that's a big deal. you know, the what's his name, the crazy bomber general. i'm curtis lemay. curtis lemay is busy setting up the strategic air command, and he definitely doesn't his b-29s, you know, used for close air support or even in this war at all. and he's pushed to do it, you know? okay, there are. well, we'll find ways to have a strategic sac contribution to this. he's also aware that there's going to be important to be in the war but tack is not on the agenda. and you know they're shipping over crated. and putting them together.
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you know, and and they're having, you know, come up with a whole set of new procedures for close air support. and the air force like any good, you know, new service, trying to find it. it's it's budgetary way it wants independent mission and is that mission right that's as the and tac a thing that is not a good you know to run your your career and so i think it does it does have consequences yeah so ron i know you're combat infantry badges want to recognize you and your service thank you so much. yeah. this is the first war in which the army. can't call on its own air support because the air force part of the army in world war two. so you've got all that kind of bureaucratic ma between the new air force, which exactly wants its own kind of strategic mission and doesn't want much to do with close air support. and you then, then really senior
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level army and air force officers now to start going at loggerheads to figure that out. and it's all done really on the fly the have a real advantage in this respect in the korean war because they've got their built in marine aviation. and so the the the marine aviators really had a reputation of being the best closers supporters in this war. but but also, i would say, you know, once the air force gets going on this and, you know, you really begin to see the importance of it. i mean, the the close air support, the air does get a lot better, but it's the product of an incredible amount of of figuring in per mutating and negotiating and pushing and pulling at the really at the the eighth army and upwards level throughout throughout a lot of this war from the perspective of the average soldier on the ground, there's never enough of it it's it's not efficient enough. it's it's not deadly enough. and there's always complained at the the platoon and company commander level that we just can't get the factor we want and
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that and that's especially for the first year to a year and a half of war. you know, a lot of the air force people would, you know, say that you know they're getting us to call in the air missions and things that they need to go clear themselves. what drops out is the interdiction campaign. right, because you know airmen have a lot of different ways of fighting an independent aerial arm. and one of the things that they're arguing in korea is that, you know, the the supply lines for the communist forces are quite long and they spend a lot of time hitting stuff that is coming over from from russia and prc. and the army is like, where are you? are you where are you? well, when we move north. they start seeing all the burned out trains, the burned out tanks, the tank transporters. and they realize air force has actually been quite busy just out of their line of sight. thank you very. my name is kristen crouse. we ph.d. candidate at texas a&m
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university. i was hoping you guys would comment on the experiences of starvation, exposure, disease, displacement, both during the war and the warriors. thank you. your guys's turn. what we're talking starvation. that's the p.o.w. experience. think if we're in the military. civilians, of course. and i won't attempt to. i mean, that is an enormous topic. dislocation, starvation, disease, all the other issues there. but in terms of what american soldiers might have experience, are american military personnel with starvation. i mean, you're talking primarily the p.o.w. experience, which really kind of arkansas war two on some levels of i would compare being incarcerated in this war by the communists is similar to being incarcerated by the japanese in world two in that. but i think your challenge is this time is certainly you know the probation of not enough to eat and the exposure to the elements and all that but more on the mental and emotional side
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because you are a propaganda piece for them, much more so than in the field. abuse would have been in in world war two. so that's a little bit of a new and a new dimension, but perhaps to develop more because japanese use some as propaganda pieces. if we're talking about it, the sort of soldier level of just typical privation of military life, i think that undernourished men is probably a better term than in starvation because you know, if we are operating in in north korea in the fall of 1950 and it's getting cold, we probably don't have enough sea rations and and, you know, other other kinds of food to sustain us to to get three meals a day. but we're much better off than our enemies. we are not necessarily prepared for the elements because you're talking about horrendous winter weather, you know, and just the and and the other point i make, and it's not just this war, but many others as bad as this is for the american soldiers, it's

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